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 Struggles over identity in diplomacy:  
“commie terrorists” contra “imperialists” in Western Sahara 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How does diplomacy recognise the political identity of international actors? Drawing on critical 
approaches, this article analyses the development of identities in diplomatic communications 
concerning the Western Sahara conflict from the early 2000s to the present. It argues that a failure 
to question relationships between identities as projected in diplomatic sources and those of global 
threats like Islamic terrorism is a crucial driver behind the stalemate. 
The analysis demonstrates that POLISARIO and Morocco became subsumed into the binary 
identities of the War on Terror due to the dominance of concerns about terrorism pervading 
diplomatic communication. Morocco played a significant role in this identification through textual 
interventions that linked POLISARIO identity to concerns about terrorism, gaining significant 
agency in the articulation of US and French policy on the conflict. This case illustrates how 
representations of identity in diplomatic communication in relation to dominant policy concerns 
grant actors agency for policy outcomes. 
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 Introduction  
Name-calling has a role in contemporary diplomacy. Moroccan governments and Sahrawi 
independence movement Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro 
(POLISARIO) call each other “Communists”, “terrorists”, and “imperialists” at every available 
opportunity. Linking POLISARIO to global identities like Communism or Islamic terrorism 
through diplomacy achieves far more than insult. These identities globalise the conflict, for anti-
imperialism, Communism and Islamic terrorism have defined the widest international struggles 
since the end of WWII. Such name-calling, it is argued, releases agency for actors to pursue policies 
that might otherwise appear less acceptable to allies and the international community. This is the 
case with POLISARIO, whose identity was subsumed into the global binary of the Cold War from 
the beginning of the conflict in 1975, and subsequently to also being a facilitator of Islamic 
terrorism in the 2000s. This represents a staggering success of Moroccan diplomacy: the alignment 
of Moroccan and POLISARIO identities with the latest dominant global security concerns, 
contributing to securing significant US and French support for Moroccan occupation and 
administration of the Western Sahara non-self-governing territory.  
This article analyses diplomatic communication in the Western Sahara conflict to explore 
how diplomatic communication about political identity enabled Morocco to pursue policy outcomes 
from the early 2000s to the present. POLISARIO defines itself as a defender of the Sahrawi nation 
that seeks self-determination and recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). 
POLISARIO highlights the plight of over 100,000 Sahrawi refugees in camps at Tindouf awaiting 
self-determination since the desert exodus of 1975, whilst accusing Morocco of imperialism. 
Morocco claims sovereignty over what it considers its southern provinces. As part of this claim it 
defines POLISARIO as a Cold War hangover; a Communist dictatorship controlled by Algeria's 
geopolitical interests, implicated in crime, smuggling, and Islamic terrorism – in contrast to 
Moroccan democracy and human rights. POLISARIO stands accused of being simultaneously 
Communist and Islamic fundamentalist, holding a dictatorial grip on the Tindouf camps and 
facilitating lawlessness. Notably, similar contradictory narratives thrived in 2003 about Iraq and the 
“Axis of Evil”. A British journalist opined that 'attempts to tar POLISARIO with the Al Qaeda 
brush have been as cack-handed as the previous depictions of POLISARIO fighters as being, 
variously, Cuban mercenaries, Iranian-backed revolutionaries and allies of Ahmed Jibril'.1 However, 
even if not wholly believed, Moroccan diplomatic discourse has been successful with successive US 
and French administrations. This is significant in understanding and querying policy responses 
beyond the Sahel, to the War on Terror and broader analysis of diplomacy.  
That international actors would attempt to tar their enemies or exalt themselves appears 
evident. However, the question remains as to how this is achieved. This article draws on 
Postructuralist concepts of identity and discourse analysis methods to investigate how diplomatic 
communication constitutes readings of political identity. It finds that “recognising” an actor is not a 
grand single policy decision, but the outcome of a process of identification of international actors. 
In this process, a reading of the political identity of an international actor emerges from a series of 
small decisions, acts of drafting to be precise. This is a process of writing. Individual diplomats 
write reports, analysis and advice about foreign international actors and send them on; these are 
read, analysed, summarised and their relevance evaluated before being sent on again. At each stage, 
 as communication about an actor moves through the structures of formal and informal diplomatic 
institutions, each individual adds and subtracts details, offers analysis, advice and selects evidence. 
Engagement with the practice of diplomatic writing and its texts in this analysis demonstrates that 
the relevance of information communicated in this process is governed by dominant policy 
concerns like the War on Terror. As a result, information irrelevant to these concerns is dropped 
form subsequent communication. Crucially, the “relevance” governing these choices can in some 
cases be highlighted by communicative interventions by other actors. 
 In the case of the Western Sahara, Moroccan interventions in US diplomacy’s process of 
identification of POLISARIO have resulted in the dismissal of Sahrawi nationalist claims and 
identification as part of the War on Terror by the US and France, to the benefit of the Moroccan 
regime’s policy of annexation. This does not mean that foreign ministries in France and the US are 
unaware of the claims and history of the Sahrawi. Rather, understanding of their identities is read 
predominantly through the established policy concern about terrorism. By globalising the local 
conflict against POLISARIO, Moroccan diplomacy has been able to associate its own identity and 
POLISARIO's to the binary identities of the War on Terror. 
It is possible and necessary to analyse diplomatic communication through the intersubjective, 
historical and contemporary factors that contribute to the constitution of identity. Postructuralist 
theorists argue that political identity is constructed and contingent and that the language in which it 
is articulated not only represents identity, but also participates in its construction.2 Far from 
instrumentally representing and identifying identity, diplomacy is a practice constitutive of 
representations of political identity.3 Treating articulations of identity as textual production through 
discourse analysis methods reveals how identities are constituted and inserted within specific 
structures of interpretation and subjectivity such as the binary of the War on Terror. Drawing on 
Postructuralist concepts of identity-formation, this article applies these methods to analyse how 
representations of identity are constituted in the text of diplomatic communication surrounding the 
Western Sahara conflict from the early 2000s to the present. 
Identification in diplomacy as an enabler of agency for policy outcomes explains 
relationships like the diplomatic support of Morocco by the US and France. The method and 
analysis in this article offers an insight of scholarly and policy salience into the Western Sahara 
conflict, concerns about terrorism in the Sahel, and the diplomacy of the War on Terror. Most 
importantly, conceptualising how diplomatic communication constitutes perceptions of identity 
advances understanding of the role of diplomacy in informing policymaking and more generally the 
role of political identity in policy decisions. The next section outlines theoretical IR developments 
that enable this analysis and its methodology. Subsequently, a review of scholarship on the Western 
Sahara conflict introduces the analysis of Western Sahara diplomatic communication.  
 
Reading identity in diplomacy 
That actors seek to use “image” in their diplomatic relations to enable policy outcomes is clear. 
Jonathan Fisher charts how Ugandan diplomacy has promoted the country as a “reliable partner” in 
the War on Terror.4 This does not, however, tell us how this image works, or how it imposes itself 
 on previous images. What is it about these messages that “clicked” with readers?  
 Postructuralist scholars have drawn attention to the crucial role of identity in the constitution 
of international political subjects, showing how constructions of identity are crucial in informing 
considerations of security, threats and conflict. William Connolly convincingly conceptualised 
identity as a living text, evolving through articulations, contradictions categorisations and 
interventions. Articulation is not based on an underlying reality but political subjectivity.5 The 
constructions of identity and difference are mutually constitutive and, as David Campbell argues, 
the construction of security policy is related to the articulation of a threatening Other.6 Political 
identity is additionally a discursive mediation that locates a subject within a specific subjectivity.7 
In other words, the identification of actors’ political identity locates it in relation to other better-
known actors, situating it in an intersubjectively comprehensible position.8 A possible consequence 
of representation of identity is the enabling of what Vivienne Jabri calls a 'discourse of exclusion 
implicated in the legitimation of violence’ which categorises the subject as the excluded Other and a 
security concern.9 As Convincingly treated by Postructuralist IR literature on global governance and 
critical security studies, the constitution of an actor’s political identity can in turn unlock 
mechanisms of security, global governance or enable alliances and support. 10  Such is the 
importance of knowing whom we and the Other are.  
 James Der Derian took this Postructuralist concept into the study of diplomacy, positing 
diplomacy as a practice based on the representation and mediation of identity and alterity. Most 
importantly, diplomacy is also constitutive of alterity through its communicative practices.11 
Diplomacy is not merely an instrument of the state, but also constitutive of its relations, 
communication and the “recognition” of other actors. The intersubjective inscription of a subject is 
itself a political act. Michael Shapiro argues that this act occurs in communication whose discursive 
construction can be analysed as textual production.12 Discourse analysis retrieves where subjects are 
inscribed in temporal, spatial and ethical dimensions –which are key parts of identity-formation, 
and, by what linguistic and ideational means. As analysed by Edward Said for instance, to identify a 
subject as “oriental” is to linguistically locate them within precast subjectivities and causal links. 
Postructuralist analysis has in this way successfully explored how constructions of identity have 
been implicated in constituting understanding of particular conflicts through analysis of the 
constitution of those identities.13  
 The methodology demanded of this perspective requires treating diplomatic communication 
as a text, relating it to previous iterations and the evolution of the discursive context. Applying 
Postructuralist discourse analysis to diplomatic communication necessitates establishing a rationale 
for source selection, an analytical sequence to account for intersubjectivity, and a chronological 
perspective to identify the emergence of a dominant inscription of identity over others.  
It is first necessary to establish who speaks on behalf of an international actor. We can then 
look to the text they produce as the site of each act of identification and the focus of this analysis. 
This is resolved through consideration of the instance of practice, for '[w]hich expression of identity 
dominates or prevails is dependent on the degree of control different social groups exercise over 
discursive and institutional practices.'14 Iver Neumann argues that focus on practice, as well as 
language, is crucial in locating the instances where agency is invested in international practices.15 
 As argued by Costas Constantinou , what makes a communication ‘diplomatic’ is its conditioning 
by the knowledge that it represents sovereignty. This ‘delegation of presence’ is the key condition 
of possibility for diplomatic practice.16  
Individual practices of diplomacy are invested in the production of text. In negotiations for 
instance, the primary objective is to reach agreement on a draft.17 This writing is the political event 
that 'can bestow identity'.18 Evidence for analysis is therefore selected in relation to the claim of 
sovereign representation that diplomatic writing entails: the diplomatic text. Since this 
representation does not take place at the foreign ministry alone, this methodology includes 
diplomatic cables and communication by actors in contexts where they represent the state: leaders, 
politicians, government departments, and their formally-recognised agents. Primary sources 
analysed in this article include press releases, analysis and policy statements by the Moroccan 
Conseil Royal Consultatif pour les Affaires Sahariennes (CORCAS), US-registered Moroccan 
government agent Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), state-run state-owned press 
agency Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP),19 Morocco-based charity Collective of Human Rights 
Associations of the Sahara (CHRAS), leaked US diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks, 
Association Soutien à un Référendum Libre et Régulier au Sahara Occidental (ARSO), and 
Brussels-based thinktank European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC).20 Including 
research and opinion by other organisations aligned with both sides achieves a triangulation of 
sources and avoids over-determining formal and institutional roles. Primary sources consulted total 
950.21 
 The second methodological requirement of this perspective is to account for 
intersubjectivity. That is, accounting for how dominant policy concerns influence the reading and 
categorisation of identities between and across actors and knowledges. This requires understanding 
how a text makes sense in terms of preceding texts and diplomatic messages, reading the diplomatic 
text in parallel to the text of dominant policy concerns -statements prioritising certain policies such 
as antiterrorism. The analysis accounts for the development of political identity referents and of 
existing policy concerns, in respect to themselves and in relation to one another. This development 
points to the potential political productivity of identities and their situation in the prevalent reading 
of global threats and goods. To trace developments and shifts in expressions of identity and its 
internal ordering in the empirical evidence topoi are identified. Topoi are literary textual markers 
that can be charted in analysis across different texts and their development can be measured 
according to the described method.22 
 Thirdly, accounting for the development of perceptions of identity involves determining 
how their history led to their present constitution. When developments of topoi of identity and 
expressions of policy concern are contrasted chronologically, the analysis can explain how the 
association and constitution of identity operates in the local and global economy of identity. In other 
words, we can trace how an idea of identity emerged dominant over others.23 This analysis retraces 
the history of a policy position to gauge the role of political identity construction in its adoption. 
These instances are the failure to reach agreement at the Manhassett negotiations 2007-8 and to 
assign human rights monitoring to the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) in successive Security Council authorisations 2006-13. This means analysing how 
those positions came to be, their genealogy from 2013 to 2003, when US diplomatic 
 communication suggests US policy towards North Africa and the Sahel became dominated by 
counterterrorism.  
 
The Western Sahara conflict 
What the Western Sahara is, who the Sahrawi are and their political claims have long been the 
subjects of struggle in diplomacy as well as media, culture, law and scholarship. In 1974 three key 
arguments were at the heart of Morocco’s demand for sovereignty over the former Spanish colony. 
Firstly, that the non-self governing territory was, before Spanish colonisation in 1884, tied to the 
sovereign rule of the Sultans of Morocco. Secondly, sovereignty was predicated on religious and 
tribal leadership of Moroccan Sultans –rather than territoriality. 24  Thirdly, on this basis, 
decolonisation principles and processes enshrined in the UN Charter supported immediate 
annexation under UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, paragraph 6. The 1974 
International Court of Justice ruling that assessed these claims identified ties of fealty between some 
tribes and the Sultan, but none amounting to sovereignty, thus confirming the right to self-
determination.25 These arguments were also the focus of scholarship on the conflict from the late 
1970s. The pre-colonial past of Sahrawi tribes and pre-1975 nationalist efforts are convincingly 
documented.26 It has been argued that the monarchy’s survival may even depend on its endeavour in 
the ‘Southern Provinces’ since the latter elicits support even from the Islamist parties.27 In the 
context of 1970s Moroccan politics, inspired partly by nationalist revival Istiqlal party, the 
Moroccan monarchy benefitted from laying claim to the territory.28 
Research on Sahrawi identity and culture has explored the role of poetry in Sahrawi cultural 
self-definition and how the Moroccan government appropriates traditional poetry festivals 
(moussems) 'that emphasise national belonging through symbols including Moroccan flags, official 
government delegations, and collective prayer and the extent to which Saharawi youths regard these 
with disdain, retorting with nationalist alternatives.’29 Qualitative examination of Sahrawi refugee 
blogs identifies recurring historical motifs fundamental to the narrative of national identity: a 
mythical pre-colonisation golden age; cultural silence during colonialism; the memory of invasion; 
Hassaniya Arabic, poetry, culture, dress; and finally the struggle for the homeland. 30  Both 
POLISARIO and Morocco build identity and narratives seeking to 'hegemonise a collective social 
imaginary about what it is to be Saharawi.’31  
Governance in the Tindouf camps has endeavoured to overcome tribal divisions and instil a 
political subjectivity around the symbols of the SADR. This performance of national identity and 
pre-figuration of the state might have resulted in greater democracy within the SADR territories and 
camps, renewing desires of a Sahrawi state.32 It has been observed that the refugee population has 
created new social and political structures differing from those of pre-exile tribal households and 
wartime social units and spaces, which speaks of a new, post-conflict Sahrawi identity arising from 
the experience of war and exile.33 This is exacerbated by differences stemming from education 
abroad and foreign links, particularly to Spain and Cuba, as well as the contrasting roles of women 
in the camps.34 Debates on SADR democratisation and convincing challenge of the ‘stalled 
democracy’ thesis point to differences with other regional political structures.35 The dissemination 
and multiplicity of forms of resistance evidenced in the 2005 Intifada and 2010 uprising (predating 
 the Tunisian ‘Arab Spring’) suggest that the independence struggle is finding expression beyond the 
structures of POLISARIO and SADR.36  
Whilst Morocco’s Cold War role was important (and willingness by allies to assist was 
greater), the case has arguably been overstated and is challenged by the end of Communism and 
continued support for Morocco by US and French diplomacy, including the use of vetoes to prevent 
any imposition on Morocco. 37  Where diplomacy meets academia, former POLISARIO 
representative to the UK Sidi Omar revisits the early conflict, blaming it on the conflict between 
Sahrawi legal right to self-determination and US and French realpolitik approach to the issue before 
mounting a defence of Sahrawi cultural and political identity.38 Former MINURSO head Erik 
Jensen argues that negotiations and the territory’s future depend on outside powers, particularly the 
US and Algeria.39 Jacob Mundy researched this through declassified CIA archives, concentrating on 
the US role in persuading Spain to acquiesce to Moroccan demands in 1975.40 He makes the case 
that anti-communism trumped self-determination, but does not reveal how Moroccan diplomatic 
communication convinced US policymakers that this was a Cold War conflict. This raises the need 
to inquire how Morocco has been able to persuade the US and France of the importance of its cause 
and obtain significant support. 
 In 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger offered this analysis to President Ford: ‘On the 
Spanish Sahara, Algerian pressure has caused the Spanish to renege. Algeria wants a port and there 
are rich phosphate deposits.’41 The Sahrawis or POLISARIO were not mentioned. He was perhaps 
partially convinced by the “Algerian Stooge” argument (promoted by Morocco to this day) and 
partially concerned about Morocco’s political welfare. Analysis of policy-making in 1975 raises the 
question of whether it might be queried at a level other than Kissinger’s own assumptions of 
international reality, of what the US “really” did and its interests. Beyond a Bismarkian operation of 
instrumental diplomacy, we might query what knowledges informed Kissinger. Applying the 
methodology detailed above to evidence of the 1975 crisis in documents released 2007-13 permits 
analysis of communication and data available to policy-makers and provides a startling addendum 
to the literature on the conflict. It firstly involves locating the instance of practice in the 
identification process: when drafts are produced, each selecting information, adding analysis and 
passing it on, eventually all the way to Kissinger and President Ford. It secondly requires relating 
the identification in the diplomatic text to dominant policy concerns. In this case they are anti-
communism, read through Morocco’s role in anti-Soviet efforts, which is widely reported and 
discussed in diplomatic communication. Finally, the genealogy of the instances of identification 
analysed in cables and reports reveals how dominant policy concerns affected identification and 
became perpetuated.  
The diplomatic text tells us how this happened. Key topoi followed are Sahrawi nationalism, 
right to self-determination, Moroccan sovereignty, Moroccan anticommunism, and Algerian 
geopolitical design. The genealogy makes the development of these topoi apparent. At the 
beginning of the crisis diplomatic communication and analysis identifies POLISARIO as a 
nationalist, anticolonial and anti-Spanish movement. Sahrawi claims are considered legitimate on 
the basis of comparable demands for self-determination by the territory’s elected assembly and an 
opposition party.42 Mundy’s research and the CIA and State department evidence, however, 
indicates that political identification was later to suffer from significant shortcomings. Might it be 
 that, despite the clarity of intelligence and diplomatic reports, Realist Kissinger was misguided by 
Cold War name-calling in Moroccan diplomacy? The genealogy of the main topoi indicates that 
elements behind the discursive legitimacy of the Sahrawi cause gradually disappear from cables and 
reports. Some notable examples are the other Sahrawi party, the territorial assembly, Hassaniya 
language and ethnic origin. Gradually information and analysis shifts onto a potential Moroccan-
Algerian conflict in which POLISARIO appears as an ancillary actor.43 By September 1975 
intelligence and state department summaries barely mention POLISARIO, concentrating instead on 
Morocco-Algeria relations and potential war over the territory.44 The same focus is apparent in a 
detailed memorandum for Kissinger. Its cover summary does not mention POLISARIO and focuses 
on the potential for a Moroccan war against Spain or especially Algeria. POLISARIO only appears 
in speculation as to potential Algeria responses.45 In fact POLISARIO only features separately of 
Morocco and Algeria in reports from Madrid focusing on the Spanish role in the crisis.46 Only one 
report I could find, from 1975, mentions POLISARIO’s own diplomatic representation.47  
Information and analysis about POLISARIO were disappearing, substituted for 
considerations of global import: Morocco’s alliance to the US and North African geopolitics.48 
Information about POLISARIO itself and the Sahrawi cause and people were dropping off because 
of their irrelevance to dominant policy concerns. At the same time Moroccan diplomacy was 
seeking US assistance arguing that POLISARIO were Algerian and anti-US agents, effectively 
globalising the conflict. The Algerian puppet thesis became believable because this frame denuded 
POLISARIO of agency. Analyses such as Kissinger’s located agency in Algiers, this is how 
POLISARIO disappears altogether from Kissinger’s advice to President Ford. Even if not wholly 
believed, the contingency that the Algerian and anti-US puppet thesis might prove true was 
sufficiently credible to lead France and the US to actively support Morocco in 1975.49 This 
internationally overdetermined identification was made possible by the hollowness and lack of 
agency of what remained of POLISARIO identity read in “Algerian” terms. 
This paper now turns to the empirical analysis of how diplomatic communication 
represented identity after the end of the Cold War and was able to secure continued support for 
Morocco during the War on Terror. The following sections analyse empirical evidence from, firstly, 
a local perspective, especially POLISARIO’s identity against Morocco’s and, secondly, identifying 
the conflict in a regional and international context in the period 2003-2013. The analysis seeks to 
elucidate particularly how diplomatic communication was able to effect a shift in representations of 
Morocco and POLISARIO from Cold Warriors to identities of the War on Terror.  
 
Writing POLISARIO and Morocco 
Three crucial topoi are observable in Moroccan diplomatic sources relating to POLISARIO in a 
local context: POLISARIO’s association with criminal activity; human rights abuses at the Tindouf 
camps, and contrast with Moroccan democracy, human rights and prosperity. Moroccan 
government sources follow a discursive line emphasising POLISARIO’s lucrative and criminal 
abuse of humanitarian aid. Moroccan government-sanctioned Collective of Human Rights 
Associations in the Sahara (CHRAS) argues that POLISARIO 'proceeds systematically to embezzle 
huge parts of humanitarian aid destined to the sequestered populations of Tindouf.'50 This is a 
 recurring topoi in MAP, CORCAS and MACP.51 MAP highlights POLISARIO contraband and 
trafficking, as well as supporting Sahel terrorists in varied capacities.52 International solidarity in 
the form of NGO and UN material assistance is posed against POLISARIO's alleged criminality, 
questioning the association between POLISARIO and the refugees it represents. Highlighting 
criminality in an armed movement like POLISARIO is a throwback to existing harrowing topoi –
like Somalian guerrillas confiscating truckloads of UN food and medicine during a famine.53 
POLISARIO is situated not unlike Colombia's FARC: a Communist movement involved in drug 
trade and kidnapping. This locates POLISARIO and its cause in reference to policy concerns 
increasingly powerful since the 1980s: terrorism, drug trade, civil destruction, illicit wars such as 
those of Pablo Escobar, FARC, and Al Qaeda. Identifying an actor in this way is of consequence: an 
actor is seen as less political than criminal, appealing to policy norms of the War on Drugs and 
ungoverned criminal spaces rather than conflict resolution. 
 Moroccan government sources constantly point to human rights abuses by POLISARIO in 
Tindouf. CHRAS describes refugees forbidden from returning to Morocco, POLISARIO 'thugs' 
falsifying refugee figures, and Moroccan plans to ‘urgently’ and ‘humanely’ repatriate Sahrawi 
refugees who have become a 'professional confined population'.54 In another report CHRAS 
describes in harrowing detail human rights abuses occurring at the camps, including: kidnapping of 
nomads to swell numbers 'estimated at 40,000 persons', the enrolment and forced indoctrination of 
refugees as guerrilla fighters, the indoctrination of children, police surveillance, brutality and torture, 
'psychological conditioning', the imposition of 'an education based on hatred and mind of 
savageness(sic)', compulsory polygamy to 'occupy his combatants', imprisonment in underground 
cells, and no freedom of information.55 POLISARIO stands accused of totalitarian rule with a 
'diabolic stamp on the repression services'.56 MAP highlights atrocities whenever reference is made 
to POLISARIO, peace negotiations, Morocco's own human rights record or even Algeria.57 The 
Brussels-based think tank European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) echoes 
topoi in Moroccan sources, for instance assuming POLISARIO is 'taking hostage the tens of 
thousands of Saharaoui refugees living in the camps of Tindouf'.58 These textual interventions 
achieve considerable reframing of POLISARIO identity. Appealing to familiar and near-global 
policies against human rights abuses, using vocabulary and analogy such as 'internment camps', 
disregard for children and women, Moroccan discourse conjures phantoms familiar in Western 
political memory.59 
 Democratic Moroccan rule stands in contrast to the 'obscurist totaliatarianism of 
POLISARIO'.60 This discursive line is linked to the only 'realistic and practical' solution to the 
conflict: Morocco's own proposal to grant the 'southern provinces' limited autonomy under 
Moroccan sovereignty.61 It hinges on acceptance of the 'legitimacy of Morocco's presence in its 
Sahara' as the only democratic recourse to peace and CORCAS as the only organisation to 
'represent all the components of the Saharawi population.'62 The autonomy initiative references 
liberal values, aiming 'to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective 
and individual freedoms, and economic and social development'. After negotiations 'the autonomy 
statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the 
principle of self-determination and with the provision of the UN Charter.'63 The statute also includes 
rights for women, reconciliation, no 'discrimination or exclusion' for Sahrawis and promises refugee 
repatriation and economic development. CORCAS insists the proposal is 'an advanced form of self-
 determination in the 21st Century'64 and is compared to federal constitutions and the UK's 1990s 
devolutions.65 The proposal maintains the basic monarchic sovereignty claim from 1975 despite its 
pre-1884 homage-and-fealty origin. Some US diplomats were convinced: 'real political competition, 
while perhaps not democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like POLISARIO system.'66 The 
cables do not reflect full acceptance of Moroccan claims of POLISARIO human rights abuses –nor 
is the issue given much importance– but do accept that its democracy is developing and should be 
supported. Morocco's autonomy initiative appears as the only solution to the Algerian-created 
impasse only supported by a 'small vocally pro-POLISARIO minority'.67 The cables reveal this 
focus was passed up the chain of information.  
 The autonomy initiative was enthusiastically endorsed. 68 Former US ambassador to the UN 
2005-6 John Bolton ensured that autonomy as a basis for talks was enshrined in UN Security 
Council resolutions 1754 and 1920 and the plan became the basis of the failed 2007-2008 
Manhasset negotiations.69 Nicolas Sarkozy declared in 2007 that France considers the plan 'credible 
and constructive' and that this conflict must be resolved on account of crime, trafficking and 
terrorism in North Africa.70 Sarkozy praised Moroccan 'transparency and good organisation of 
legislative elections' and emphasised that Morocco receives more French aid than any other 
country.71 French politicians including senators, jurists and MP François Grosdidier echoed this 
praise, which was enthusiastically circulated by MAP and CORCAS.72 The Quai d'Orsay in 2007 
called the plan 'real, broad autonomy',73 and in 2011 endorsed it as the basis for negotiations.74 
MAP and CORCAS emphasise this, repeatedly citing the 'importance and credibility' that France 
and the US attribute to Morocco's proposal.75  
 A 2006 CORCAS delegation visit to the US Congress found the American position in 
alignment with their own on trade and the non-self-governing territory, reaping compliments from 
congressmen about advances in Moroccan democracy, economic development and trade 
liberalisation. CORCAS delegate Khalihenna Ould Errachid declared that 'US interest is centred in 
the promotion of democracy, pluralism, tolerance'. Rep. Jim Kolbe hailed Morocco as a model of 
tolerance and modernity in the Arab world, and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen promised 'we will 
continue to work to help Morocco resolve the issue of the Sahara' since 'the autonomy proposal 
complies with the principles that the United States is working to disseminate.’76 More recently, 
French UN mission spokesman Stephane Crouzat declared in 2011 that the Arab Spring was not a 
phenomenon it would support in Morocco, 'what Morocco needs from the international community 
is encouragement and support’  
POLISARIO diplomatic communication efforts focus on the illegality of the Moroccan 
occupation, autonomy plan, and human rights abuses. Former POLISARIO Representative to the 
UK and Ireland Sidi M Omar attributes Moroccan motives to the '”Greater Morocco” ideology 
which, 'endorsed by the monarchy, asserted that the then Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, part of Mali, a 
large part of the western Algerian desert and even part of Senegal all belonged to a distant 
Moroccan empire.' He points to Moroccan 'massive resettlement campaigns' to populate the 
territory with Moroccans, human rights abuses and the berm –the wall separating the occupied 
territory from POLISARIO. The conflict is the result of French and American realpolitik, 'which 
was clearly allowed to displace international law'. Morocco can 'influence the UN through its 
privileged relations with some members of the Security Council, such as France, in a process aimed 
 at legitimatizing its occupation and illegal annexation of Western Sahara'.77 In 2008, former 
POLISARIO representative to the UK and Ireland Y. Lamine Baali wrote to members of the 
European Parliament addressing human rights violations in the occupied territory, citing evidence 
from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, requesting EU assistance in resolving the 
conflict. In The Guardian POLISARIO secretary-general Mohamed Abdelaziz wrote about 
Morocco selling rights to fish in Sahrawi waters to the EU, highlighting the plight of the exiled 
Sahrawi population, Morocco's violations of human rights in the territory and 'sabotage' of the 
referendum. They called on EU high representative for foreign affairs Baroness Ashton to act to 
'exclude the Sahrawi areas from the fisheries', require that Morocco cooperate with the UN and the 
Polisario Front, implement the agreed referendum on self-determination', and 'recognise and 
establish diplomatic relations with the Saharawi republic'.78 POLISARIO representations have since 
been unsuccessful in reverting fishing concessions in the territory. As a result of POLISARIO 
diplomacy, the State Department in 2012 investigated Moroccan human rights violations in the 
territory, as did a UK parliamentary cross-party committee in February 2014.79  
POLISARIO have experienced limited success in diplomatically challenging US and French 
support for Morocco. Despite a UN report deploring Moroccan security preventing MINURSO 
access to inhabitants of the territory, POLISARIO failed to obtain MINURSO supervision of human 
rights compliance.80 However, whilst not entirely believed, Morocco has been successful in the 
identity definition struggle in local terms. As evidenced in the analysis, topoi highlighted by 
Moroccan diplomatic communication in relation to POLISARIO reflected dominant US and French 
policy concerns of the 2000s: POLISARIO’s totalitarianism, contraband, trafficking and links to 
Sahel terror. These are discursively contrasted to Morocco’s efforts to democratise, protect human 
rights and grant autonomy to the non-self-governing territory.  
 
Writing POLISARIO and Morocco in a global context 
Moroccan diplomacy focuses on two international characterisations of the conflict. Firstly, 
POLISARIO is a communist pawn of Algeria since Sahrawi independence is unviable and 
unwanted; secondly POLISARIO is linked to terrorism in the Sahel. This clearly links POLISARIO 
to policy concerns that stretch back to the 1980s and 1990s and clearly dominant after September 11 
and the insurgency in Northern Mali. Moroccan sources portray POLISARIO as a bad case of Cold 
War hangover, an obsolete ideology from 'a past epoch'. 81  This is compounded by claims 
(especially from CHRAS) of communist-style indoctrination, with children 'indoctrinated in a 
culture of hatred in Cuba.'82 POLISARIO ideology is conflated with Algerian revolutionary 
ideology and Marxism, providing a striking pedigree of evil. 83 These are particularly resonant 
images in the USA and France; Communism is the evil ‘Other’ of the past for American 
policymakers as is Algerian revolutionary nationalism for France. Claims of POLISARIO being 
both communist and Islamic extremist and a pawn of Algeria –even as Algeria fought a brutal war 
against Islamic insurgents- are severely contradictory. This points to the need to explore this 
diplomatic communication and how its effectiveness might overcome these contradictions. The 
principal topoi to trace are therefore Algerian aggression harking back to dictatorial Communism 
and violent anti-colonial North African revolutions in Algeria, Libya and Egypt, and POLISARIO 
 as a facilitator of terrorism.  
 Moroccan diplomacy has been successful in portraying POLISARIO as an Algerian agent 
seeking not Sahrawi independence but to destabilise Morocco in a struggle for 'hegemony' by 
creating and supporting an 'artificial dispute over the Sahara'.84 POLISARIO is a 'parasitical entity', 
fighting 'an artificial dispute' to serve Algerian interests even utilising the cause of human rights 
since 'each of its steps remains hostage to Algerian orientation'.85 ESISC agrees, stating that 
POLISARIO is 'following orders from Algiers' and is part of a larger Moroccan-Algerian strategic 
rivalry traceable back to the Sand War.86 Sahrawi independence, Moroccan sources insist, is a 
'chimaera' born of Algerian ambition and POLISARIO absolutism.87 On this basis, at the fourth 
round of talks in Manhasset, Morocco included Moroccan-Algerian concerns in the negotiations 
and made demands to Algeria, rather than POLISARIO.88 CORCAS, representing Morocco at the 
talks, 'questioned POLISARIO's right to be there'89 for 'it does not have legitimacy to pronounce 
upon this question.'90 Accordingly, MAP and CORCAS always place POLISARIO last in the list of 
participants at the talks. A 2006 US cable accepts and develops this argument, stating that since 
POLISARIO does not claim the full extent of historical Sahrawi geographical expanse (which 
would include Mauritania, Southern Morocco and parts of Mali) ‘the conflict is less nationalist than 
geopolitical, linked to the much older dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the 
case for an independent state.'91  
  '[T]he repressing and terrorist nature of POLISARIO and his will to continue to mislead the 
international public opinion' is crucial in Moroccan characterisations of POLISARIO since 2001.92 
POLISARIO as a ‘terrorist organisation' is a constant in MAP, CORCAS and CHRAS 
communication.93 There is no proof of direct links between POLISARIO and Al Qaeda, AQIM or 
Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), yet MAP, CORCAS, 
CHRAS, MACP and even ESISC claim the link with assiduous tenacity. The 2006 CORCAS 
delegation to the US congress made multiple references to 'militants close to the separatists' and 
'infiltration of terrorist movements in the region [...] a dangerous mixture consisting of movements 
outside the scope of the law, and brokers of illegal immigration and smuggling of weapons.'94 
According to CORCAS, POLISARIO is responsible for creating an area of illegality and unpoliced 
borders in the Sahel allowing for expansion and movement of terrorist organisations, echoing a 
2009 Potomac Institute warning on the danger of unpoliced areas in central Sahel.95 Prominent 
Francophone Moroccan newspaper Aujourdh'hui le Maroc claims that POLISARIO is drawing 
closer to AQIM, with disillusioned POLISARIO youths swelling the ranks of AQIM and Salafist 
groups, such that 'Tindouf risks becoming a breeding ground of terrorists according to American 
expert.'96 According to Moroccan sources, POLISARIO's link with AQIM is based on shared 
criminal revenue in the Sahel, trafficking and drug trade, POLISARIO as a source of manpower and 
converts to extremist Islam as well as links with a POLISARIO leadership desperate to strike 
Morocco. This alignment of political identity answers the urgency of anti-terror policy in the US 
since 2001 as well as EU Maghreb policy seeking security against crime, terrorism and immigration. 
 Conversely, Morocco is placed as an indispensable allied regime requiring this policy course 
for its survival. This argument emphasises to the West the importance of safeguarding friendly 
regimes in North Africa (Morocco as well as Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring) and the 
danger that Islamic extremism and ungoverned spaces pose to their survival and to US and French 
 interests. According to John Bolton, US ambassador to the UN 2005-6, the position was successful 
at the State Department. ‘They accepted Morocco’s line that independence for the Western Sahara –
which nearly everyone thought the Sahrawis would choose in a genuinely free and fair referendum– 
would destabilise Morocco and risk a takeover by extreme Islamists'. The conclusion at the State 
Department was that 'there was no doubt that stability for king Mohammed VI trumped self-
determination.'97 French diplomacy appears homogenous in its support for Morocco. Quai d'Orsay 
Morocco Desk Officer Marie Buscail declared in talks with the US embassy political officer that 
France sought 'to press ahead with the Moroccan autonomy plan as a solution for the Western 
Sahara conflict,’ requesting US assistance in pressuring Algiers to support the Moroccan autonomy 
plan.98 Sarkozy twice linked the conflict to the 'scourge of terrorism' in 2007, reiterating the need to 
'partner with Morocco against terrorism.'99 In 2010, 57 US senators agreed on the need to 'resolv[e] 
the Western Sahara to remove the major obstacle to stability in the region' –by following Morocco's 
autonomy plan.100  
 The threat of ungoverned spaces is the topoi that echoed the most in the diplomatic 
communication, with extensive analysis and commentary devoted to the issue. Whilst not 
universally accepted that POLISARIO is an Al-Qaeda ally, in most analysis it remains accused of 
facilitating ungoverned space and facilitating terrorism through crime. 101  US diplomats find 
'unregulated and ungoverned areas, including those populated by the POLISARIO refugee camps, 
[which] are real threats to cooperation and stability in the region.'102 In 2011, Moroccan Foreign 
minister Fihri made Algeria responsible for the kidnapping of two Spanish and one Italian 
volunteers in POLISARIO camps, citing the latter's lack of control over the camps themselves.103 
This gives credibility to accusations that the Tindouf camps are hotbeds for extremism. Moroccan 
sources argue that the 2012 campaign fought by a coalition of Mouvement National de Liberation 
de l'Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine forces in Northern Mali points to POLISARIO links 
with AQIM (in parallel with MNLA) and the need to control terrorism in the Sahel.104 CORCAS 
and MACP cite multiple sources (newspapers, conferences, NGOs) as proof of links between Ansar 
Dine, POLISARIO and AQIM. This situates POLISARIO as parallel to the Ansar Dine-led 
insurgency in Mali.105  
 In the diplomatic interventions observed Morocco appeals to its own identity as an ally, 
dialectically opposing its political identity to POLISARIO’s in the strategic currency of security and 
geopolitical strategy. The security threat of ungoverned spaces as terrorist sanctuaries has overcome 
American human rights concerns in policy-making despite recommendations from the Lantos 
Human Rights Commission, even reversing American support of a humanitarian role for 
MINURSO after Moroccan complaints. 106 The binary suggested by this positioning of identities 
posits Western Sahara as the price for the strategic alliance with Morocco against terrorism.  
 POLISARIO have endeavoured to refute charges of extremism and terror. Their small 
representation missions in capitals such as London and Paris cite high levels of education, role and 
independence of women, highlighting POLISARIO’s 'overwhelming support among the Saharawi 
population' as 'sole and legitimate representative'. 107  POLISARIO oppose militant Islamic 
movements in the region, making very public efforts to resist their influence in the camps. 
POLISARIO explained to American diplomats that extremist Islamic websites are censored in 
Tindouf for this reason.108 More proactively, POLISARIO Defence chief Mohamed el Bouhali 
 declared in January 2012 that Sahrawi security forces offered assistance with the aforementioned 
kidnappings of Europeans, even obtaining permission to persecute suspects across Malian 
territory.109 In 2011 the president of the SADR Parliament declared that, whilst their priority is the 
'fight against Moroccan colonialism' they are also ready to challenge terrorism.110 On the conflict 
itself, POLISARIO denies 'the use of violence against the civilians and civil targets' and remains 
'committed to war within its legal equation' and 'legal and clean resistance'.111 This effort has had 
some success in diffusing the most problematic parts of the Moroccan-projected identity about its 
goals, methods and ideology as well as international context. Several US diplomats have since 
developed a more nuanced view of POLISARIO's political identity. The US embassy in Algiers 
estimated that 'the Polisario “government” severely punishes anyone caught trafficking persons or 
weapons that could aid terrorists, bans extremist websites and persons, citing an American 
volunteer who 'assessed that the Polisario is fairly good at controlling the territory it administers'.112  
 The shift from POLISARIO as a Cold War threat to also being a facilitator of Islamic terror, 
despite the contradiction in terms, represents a staggering Moroccan diplomatic success. Moroccan 
and POLISARIO identities are now aligned with the latest dominant global security concerns. 
Despite the scepticism of some US diplomats, US policy continues to staunchly support Moroccan 
objectives.113 According to the diplomatic communication analysed, this success is due to possible 
POLISARIO proximity or facilitation of terrorism and ungoverned spaces, and the need to keep 
Morocco's monarchy in power as a US ally and strategic partner. Both positions respond to and 
depend upon US and EU policies prioritising security in the Sahel and North Africa and the 
assumption that diplomacy can unproblematically identify friend and foe, in this case the 
identification of Morocco and POLISARIO as participants in the War on Terror. This is not due to 
lack of understanding from diplomats. Rather, information on POLISARIO anti-extremist efforts 
does not enjoy the same priority and dissemination.114 This is due to the application of dominant 
policy priorities to diplomatic practice, as corroborated by a 2009 State Department cable 
instructing diplomats to collect ‘relevant reporting’ on Salafist and other terrorist movements in the 
region.115 It remains to chart how individual thematic inscriptions or topoi, have shifted and 
changed the constitution of political identity.  
 
Conclusions 
The analysis of Western Sahara diplomacy over the past decade has traced topoi related to 
POLISARIO and Moroccan identities to determine particular shifts in their textualisation. An 
overview of the development of their articulation reveals that identification of POLISARIO and 
Morocco by American and French diplomats was not a single policy decision. Identification 
emerges from a series of small decisions, acts of drafting to be precise. In each of these instances 
individual diplomats choose what details, information and analysis to add or reject before passing 
them on. 
 The analysis shows that some topoi are passed along the communication process, eventually 
informing policymakers. These include POLISARIO’s undemocratic nature, doubts as to human 
rights observance at the Tindouf camps, Moroccan progressive credentials, Morocco’s 
indispensable strategic role for the US and France, the contingency that POLISARIO might enable 
 or even assist terrorist activity and ‘ungoverned spaces’, and POLISARIO as an instrument of 
Algeria. Following these from the diplomat on the ground to high-level policymakers, it is evident 
that at times they are even amplified with further analysis and reporting –as with the claim that 
POLISARIO enables ‘ungoverned space’ and might thus assists terrorism. Other topoi do not enjoy 
the same attention. These are the 1975 Moroccan invasion and Sahrawi exodus, mass Moroccan 
immigration to the Western Sahara, Moroccan human rights violations, successful POLISARIO 
counter-extremism efforts, SADR governance, and Sahrawi nationalist claims. Notably, most 
referents behind the claim to a distinct Sahrawi national identity do not appear in US or French 
diplomatic communication. When Sahrawi details such as the Hassaniya Arabic do appear, they are 
invalidated. This is very apparent in a 2006 cable advising the State Department that, because 
POLISARIO does not claim all historical Sahrawi lands ‘the conflict is less nationalist than 
geopolitical, linked to the much older dispute between Algeria and Morocco.'116 The result observed 
is an identification of POLISARIO denuded of a vast array of referents either by omission or 
invalidation, resulting in significant contextual scarcity.  
 The diplomat’s agency, the instance of drafting and choosing what to add or leave out, is 
conditioned by the application of dominant policy concerns. A 2009 State Department cable 
instructed diplomats to collect ‘relevant reporting’ on Salafist and other extremist movements in the 
region.117 The ‘strategic priorities’ of this reporting, chiefly terrorism and activities that enable 
terrorism, are detailed over six pages, without specifying what reporting to omit. This raises the 
need to conceptualise the prioritisation of reporting to retrieve how it conditions exclusion. This 
prioritisation governed by policy concerns, I argue, functions like an episteme. That is, a body of 
ideas that grounds knowledge, discourses and their condition of possibility, ultimately determining 
their validity.118 This body of ideas informs the many small decisions of drafting by diplomats, 
governing those instances of agency, the choices as to relevance and irrelevance. Thinking of 
dominant policy concerns as epistemes is useful, for it retrieves the potential result of laying out 
policy concerns as priorities. The episteme explains how the same body of ideas can contemporarily 
prioritise certain pieces of knowledge, dismiss others as the above cable does, and provide 
frameworks to inform interpretation and analysis. The text of political identity comes to be 
dominated by information most relevant to dominant policy concerns like the War on Terror, while 
other information is dropped along the process of identification across multiple texts. This explains 
how policy concerns and priorities can simultaneously locate and evaluate the relevance of 
information and “recognise” subjects.  
 The episteme of policy priorities like anti-communism and War on Terror are normative: 
they determine what is a danger and particularly how affairs should be, providing assumptions as to 
possible and impossible responses. In this case we can see the result as the depoliticisation of a 
subject and its cause –removing them from debate, eventually applying onto them technologies of 
threat management.119 In POLISARIO’s case, this means inclusion into processes to contain 
terrorist threats. This explains how contradictions such as POLISARIO’s apparent communism and 
Islamic extremism fail to undermine identification, for they become buried and invalidated. 
Referents that highlight the contradiction such as POLISARIO efforts to keep Islamic extremism at 
bay are dropped from subsequent communications because they appear irrelevant to the episteme of 
policy concerns –US efforts to work with local allies to identify and defeat terrorists. Crucially, this 
“relevance” can be highlighted by communicative interventions by other actors. Moroccan 
 diplomacy posits its own relevance to antiterrorism and POLISARIO’s potential role in assisting 
terrorism. Though unsuccessful in directly implicating POLISARIO in terrorism, interventions into 
political identity on the basis of the contingency of that relationship have been politically productive. 
US and French policies concede that POLISARIO facilitates ungoverned spaces in the Sahel, 
providing space for terrorism. This argument is based on the epistemological value of the possibility 
that POLISARIO might be facilitating terrorism. This is effective in informing policy because of the 
relevance invested upon it by the episteme of the policy articulation of the War on Terror.  
 We can conceptualise a political identity as read by the government of an international actor 
as arising from the juxtaposition of texts authored by many diplomats. Identities are gradually 
rationalised as they move from draft to draft, some elements of identification are dropped and others 
introduced as the text develops on its way to the Prime Minister’s desk. This process is not only 
intertextual, but also constant and alive, developing by initiative and reaction, for instance including 
analysis of events taking place during this process. The chief determinant of those many small 
decisions of drafting is the articulation of dominant policy concerns, which acting as an episteme 
determines issues and subjects is to examine or ignore. It is in this process that I locate the gradual 
omission of referents of identity in favour of global-level contextualisation, analysis and 
categorisation. Some referents become obscured –or as Foucault would say, reasoned out of the 
discussion.120 As a consequence, there is a dearth of contextual information about the actor 
identified. As seen with Kissinger’s and the Bush administration’s identification of POLISARIO, 
this can result in identification that depends entirely on its epistemological relevance. In other 
words, that identity is constituted principally by its relevance to global concerns.  
 Before practices of security, counterterrorism and anti-extremism can be considered, 
subjects have to be identified. Focusing on identity-formation practices is useful in understanding 
the dynamics of political subjectivity in diplomatic communication and its political productivity. It 
tells us, ultimately, how diplomacy deals with identity and its contextualisation, and what may 
result. As this article has analysed, agency is released for policy objectives by participating in this 
process of identification. This participation in an actor’s identification process by other actors takes 
the form of textual interventions in diplomatic communication that attempt to shape the resulting 
identification and categorisation. It is found that success depends on the extent to which 
categorisation responds to dominant policy concerns. It is not even necessary for a nefarious 
relationship to be proven. In the case of POLISARIO it sufficed for the possibility of such a 
relationship to appear relevant in terms of dominant policy concerns. How such a subtle 
identification operates can be analysed with the theoretical approach and method here expounded. 
This analysis locates the instance of practice at the moment of drafting, mapping the 
intersubjectivity of identity and the intertextuality of diplomatic communication. By retracing the 
constitution of an idea of identity it is possible to retrieve how it came to be convincing and enable 
the establishment of relationships such as US and French support for Morocco. Such relationships 
are often overlooked because the capacity of peripheral (especially postcolonial) actors such as 
Morocco to inform subjectivity and to shape policy is often underestimated. This contribution 
consequently helps ‘decolonialise’ how we assess the agency of international actors and how 
diplomatic communication enables them to release agency for policy objectives.  
We can re-assess these conclusions in terms of the political productivity of the shifts in 
 identity projected by the diplomatic interventions analysed. Morocco largely succeeded in 
propelling itself and POLISARIO to the global level through interventions of diplomatic 
communication that reordered the components of its identity and POLISARIO’s. Morocco, the 
interventions suggest, is struggling with a problem related to international terrorism, ungoverned 
spaces, old revolutionary ideologies, human rights violations and crime. POLISARIO thus poses a 
danger to US and French reliance on Morocco as a long-term strategic ally because loss of the 
territory would destabilise the Moroccan regime. Furthermore, POLISARIO might after all prove to 
be part of international terrorism. Conversely, POLISARIO struggles to do the opposite: to localise 
the conflict, concentrate attention on the illegal Moroccan annexation, the plight of Sahrawi 
refugees and Moroccan repression in the territory. Many identity referents and the urgent 
contingency posited in reference to POLISARIO are direct reflections of stated priorities, threats 
and policy concerns as articulated by France and the US: Islamic terrorism, ungoverned spaces, 
Communism, human rights abuses, crime. By aligning POLISARIO with international terrorism, 
POLISARIO is attached to and understood as part of the global Other, a process of 'invocations of 
the global'.121 By making the local (POLISARIO) global, Morocco is able to invoke practices and 
political frameworks that transcend the territorial state and can result in subjective cosmopolitanism 
acting (as an exception) in the name of security. Morocco's achievement is to have attached its 
identity and POLISARIO's to the global policy concern and subjectivity of transnational terrorism, 
vastly increasing its agency in US and French policymaking.  
 As we have seen with Moroccan diplomacy, writing about identity in diplomatic 
communication can release agency for policy outcomes. This is not only of relevance for the 
Western Sahara conflict and the Sahel, but is also important to understand the dynamics of the 
diplomacy of the War on Terror. There is a tragic lesson to take away: by prioritising identification 
of terrorist activity, the stage is set for the failure of diplomatic communication to convey identity in 
terms other than those of the overarching policy concern. This analysis has shown how the very text 
of diplomatic communication is policed by that concern, its assumptions and language, losing 
factual and analytical content. As a result policy initiative is surrendered to actors that can intervene 
in the process of identification, whilst others become subsumed in global categories of danger and 
the subjects of security practices. This points to a crucial need to problematise and interrogate, 
especially in relation to global threats and their assumptions, how political identities are situated 
and recognised in this struggle over identity in the text of diplomacy. 
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